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I. INTRODUCTION
The first gene patent was issued to the Regents of the University of
California on bacterium in 1982.1 Since then, increasing knowledge about the
characteristics of gene sequences and their therapeutic effects has fueled
economic and noneconomic interests in them.2 One way to preserve the
economic value of a newly discovered gene is to procure patent protection on a
particular gene segment,3 which would give owners of gene patents exclusive
rights to use and profit from them.4 The exclusivity of gene patents has farreaching implications. Opponents of gene patents argue that gene patents
increase downstream transaction costs and thus become major barriers in the
development of biotechnology.5 Proponents of gene patents, however, seek
patent rights to protect their returns on millions of dollars of investment.6
The Supreme Court took up this hotly debated question of the patenteligibility of gene segments for the first time in Myriad Genetics.7 The Court held
that “a naturally occurring Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) segment is a product
of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated”8 because
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” have long been held
unpatentable.9 However, the Court distinguished complementary DNA, which

1 Edward Weck, Note, Exclusive Licensing of DNA Diagnostics: Is There a Negative Effect on
Quantity and Quality of Healthcare Delivery That Compels NIH Rulemaking?, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1057, 1062 (2005); see also U.S. Patent No. 4,363,877 (filed Apr. 19, 1978) (issued Dec. 14, 1982).
2 See, e.g., Larry I. Palmer, Disease Management and Liability in the Human Genome Era, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2002); Andrew W. Torrance, Gene Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, 11 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 157, 190–91 (2010); Cara Koss, Note, Oysters & Oligonucleotides: Concerns and Proposals
for Patenting Research Tools, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 747, 754 (2007).
3 Omid E. Khalifeh, The Gene Wars: Science, the Law and the Human Genome, 9 LOY. L. & TECH.
ANN. 91, 102 (2010); Cydney A. Fowler, Comment, Ending Genetic Monopolies: How the TRIPS
Agreement’s Failure to Exclude Gene Patents Thwarts Innovation and Hurts Consumers Worldwide, 25 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1073, 1084 (2010).
4 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
5 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 298–300 (2003). The public may ultimately receive some benefit
of expired patents. During the lifetime of the patent, however, the broader the scope of the
patent and the lower the competition, the less benefit the public will receive.
6 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196–97
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing various uses for isolated and purified DNA), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
7 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
8 Id. at 2111. See also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011).
9 Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
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is not naturally occurring, and thus patent-eligible.10 The impact of the
Supreme Court’s ruling on future DNA isolation and commercialization
remains to be seen. One advantage of holding isolated DNA ineligible for
patent protection is that by removing the exclusive protection that patents
provide to owners of newly discovered genes, scientists can develop advanced
tests based on the genetic information coded in the isolated genes without
incurring patent liability and litigation costs. However, this holding may
discourage private entities from investing in the discovery and isolation of
DNA.11 Alternatively, private entities may keep their newly discovered DNA as
trade secrets, frustrating patent law’s goal of encouraging the dissemination of
information for the purpose of future genetic research.
This Note proposes an approach for the protection of gene discoveries
without discouraging private investments: the formation of a Board consisting
of technical and legal experts that determines how to award an entity that
registers and publishes a newly discovered DNA segment with the Board. This
solution, called the registration-reward system, is better than other purposed
solutions, and would resolve Myriad Genetics’s negative implications for genetic
researchers.
Part II of this Note discusses the patent eligibility requirements under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and the science of isolating DNA for the purpose of gene patents.
Additionally, this part describes the Myriad Genetics case and the lack of
incentives for private investments in the discovery and isolation of DNA under
the Myriad Genetics ruling. Part III partially justifies the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Myriad Genetics, while demonstrating the insufficiency of the patent system to
address the lack of investment incentives for genetic researchers. Finally Part
III, proposes a registration-reward system administered by a newly formed
USPTO Board to award protection to an entity who registers a new DNA
segment, and why this registration-reward system is the best solution among
alternatives to promoting future genetic research in light of Myriad Genetics’s
categorical rejection of patents on naturally occurring DNA segments.

Id. at 2111.
SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, GEE PATENTS AND LICENSING
PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 1 (2010) [hereinafter
SACGHS REPORT], available at https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/108
22/515456/SACGHS_Final_Gene_Patents_Report_April2010.pdf?sequence=1.
10
11
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II. BACKGROUND
A. PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER § 101

Patent-eligible subject matter includes “any new or useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.”12 The Supreme Court has long
recognized three exceptions to this general principle: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.13 Interpreting the meaning of these three
exceptions, however, has long puzzled the courts.14 The Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty declared that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include
anything under the sun that is made by man,”15 but, in an effort to clarify the
doctrine of unpatentable subject matter, the Court has stepped back from this
holding throughout cases decided in the last half-century.16 Three of these
cases are important precedents for understanding the Myriad Genetics Court’s
holding that isolated DNA is a product of nature and thus patent ineligible.17
First, the composition patent in Funk Brothers concerned an inoculant for
leguminous plants comprising a selection of mutually non-inhibitive strains of
different species of bacteria of genus Rhizobium.18 The Supreme Court held
that “[d]iscovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria
can be mixed without harmful effect of the properties of either” is “no more
than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence is not
patentable.”19 In other words, the Court held that the composition was not
patent eligible because the patent holder ‘did not alter the bacteria in any way,’
and thus it fell within the law of nature exception.20 The Court reasoned, “[i]f
there is to be an invention from such discovery, it must come from the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”21
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1556 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting
Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 331, 334 (1983)).
14 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 725 (1990).
15 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 64 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
17 Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107.
18 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127.
19 Id. at 131.
20 Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2117 (citing Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 132).
21 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at. 130.
12
13
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The Court in Chakrakarty, on the other hand, found that when “scientists
added four plasmids to a bacterium, which enabled it to break down various
components of crude oil,” the modified bacterium was patent eligible.22 The
Court explained, the “claim is not a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon,
but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a
product of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character, and use.”23
Importantly, the bacterium had additional characteristics not found in nature,
this creating a “new . . . composition of matter.”24
Third, the patented invention in Mayo was a method of administering a drug
to a patient and measuring how the drug is metabolized against a known
threshold for efficacy.25 The Supreme Court stated that the application did not
add any inventive concept to the claimed method but instead, the application
only relied on the elements that had been known in the field.26 Thus, the
invention preempted a law of nature and was ineligible subject matter.27 As the
Court explained, “phenomena of nature, though just discovered . . . are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work. And
monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”28 The Court, in
laying the foundation for a two-step test later clarified and expanded upon by
the Court in a subsequent case,29 declared that “the claimed processes (apart
from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field,” and that
“upholding the patents would risk disproportionately tying up use of the
underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further
discoveries.”30

Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303).
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
24 35 U.S.C. § 101.
25 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1293.
29 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (“First, we determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then
ask, what else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, we consider the elements of
each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the additional
elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. We have described step
two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept.’ ” (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–97)).
30 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294.
22
23
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Once a patentee meets the requirement of eligibility, a patentee must also
demonstrate that an invention is novel,31 nonobvious,32 and enabling.33 These
three patentability requirements are separate and distinct from the § 101
analysis, and other bases for invalidating a patent. If a patentee meets all of the
statutory requirements, he or she will receive an exclusive right to use the
invention for twenty years,34 and empowering the patentee to license the
invention to others at a significant fee.
B. THE SCIENCE OF GENE PATENTS

Gene patents, although now patent-ineligible in light of Myriad Genetics, were
categorized as a “composition of matter” under § 101.35 The science behind
isolating DNA segments is thus important to understanding the Court’s
rejection of gene patents. A DNA molecule consists of two strands of long
polymer chains that are made of four types of nucleotides attached to backbone
chains.36 The two strands are twisted in a spiral ladder shape, giving rise to
“double helix” chains of nucleotides.37 DNA consisting of different series of
nucleotides provides a set of genetic instructions for the production of
proteins38 through a two-step process known as transcription and translation.
In transcription, the DNA is split and the coding strand is copied to form RNA
molecules that contain only a single gene rather than hundreds of genes.39 The
RNA molecule is modified further to form messenger RNA (mRNA).40 The
resulting mRNA is a fundamentally different molecule from its DNA
template.41 MRNA consists of only exons, a different molecule as its backbone,
and other structural changes from its DNA template.42 MRNA is then
translated to form amino acids, which are basic building blocks of proteins.43

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
Id. § 103.
33 Id. § 112.
34 Id. § 154.
35 Id. § 101; Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2109, 2113.
36 BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 197 (5th ed. 2008).
37 Id. at 197–98.
38 Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Radical Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 410 (2004) (“Human beings, by current estimates, have between 26,000 and
40,000 separate genes, spread across twenty-three chromosomes . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
39 See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 17.
40 Id. at 347–48.
41 Id. at 345.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 304.
31
32
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A mutation in the genetic code, whether by alteration of a nucleotide or by
changing sequences of nucleotides, often results in coding for defective or
nonfunctional proteins.44 “Some mutations are harmless, but others can cause
disease or increase the risk of disease. As a result, the study of genetics can lead
To diagnose genetic disorders,
to valuable medical break-through.”45
knowledge of mutations as well as the normal sequence is required.46 It is,
however, difficult to locate a mutated gene sequence. Genes consist of coding
strands and non-coding strands, and both strands have non-coding regions
(introns) interspersed between coding regions (exons), therefore making it
difficult to identify which strand is the coding strand for a particular protein.47
In order to locate a particular gene sequence, scientists create
complementary DNA (cDNA), which is a completely man-made molecule that
differs from native DNA and RNA molecule.48 The process to manufacture
cDNA is now well-known;49 scientists reverse transcribe a strand of mRNA and
create a DNA string that would be an identical copy of a non-coding DNA
strand’s coding region.50 Although it was created from mRNA, cDNA differs
from mRNA in three aspects: the cDNA is complementary to the mRNA,51 it
uses thymine nucleotides rather than uracil,52 and the sugar backbones of the
RNA and DNA stands differ.53 Also, cDNA differs from native DNA because
it is missing introns,54 it is not subjected to cellular regulation, it is not a part of
a larger structure (such as a chromosome), and it has a tail region not present in
the DNA. While cDNA lacks introns, it contains overlapping sequences with
native DNA and can attach itself with native DNA.55 Scientists thus use cDNA
as a probe for identifying mutated DNA. Scientists look at the various points

Id.
Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2112.
46 Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., DNA Sequencing, GENOME.GOV, http://www.geno
me.gov/10001177 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014).
47 Lauren M. Dunne, Case Note, “Come, Let Us Return to Reason”: Association of Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 473, 479–80 (2010) (stating
that neighboring genes can be located on opposing strands, and that many regulatory aspects of
RNA synthesis have not been well defined).
48 See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 535–37.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 543 (discussing and illustrating the reverse transcription process).
52 See id. at 332.
53 Id. at 197.
54 Since the cDNA is complementary to the mRNA and mRNA is a genetic molecule from
which introns have been spliced out, the cDNA does not have introns either.
55 See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 537.
44
45
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of attachment, find the endpoints of each gene, and then extract the newly
discovered gene with the help of specific and well-known enzymes.56
The knowledge of a genetic sequence helps advance research in genetic
testing.57 Genetic testing is useful in at least three different ways: (1) predictive
testing of a patient with a predisposition to a particular disease, (2) diagnostic
testing of a patient with suspected presence of mutated genes, and (3) genetic
testing of patients diagnosed with certain diseases to optimize drug therapy in
pharmacogenomics applications.58 Despite these important uses, private
entities hesitate to conduct genetic testing due to its cost.
A microarray-based test, however, is a promising test that allows for
marking DNA, RNA, and protein in a single experiment, and has demonstrated
a tremendous cost advantage over traditional genetic tests.59 A microarraybased test permits simultaneous analysis of thousands of gene sequences.60 The
resulting access to greater amounts of information from microarray-based
testing allows for better diagnosis and treatment. But, to further develop the
test, researchers would be required to obtain multiple licenses from gene
patents owners—one for each DNA sequence used in the test.61 With current
advances in DNA sequencing technologies, researchers are likely to discover the
complete human genome in the near future.62 In the meantime, every human
gene sequence may be subject to patent protection.63 Thus, the exclusive rights
56 See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and
Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 114–15 (2001) (discussing automation and
routinization of DNA sequencing).
57 See, e.g., Michael Tomasson, Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of Useful
Genomic Tests, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 231, 236 (2009); Courtney C. Scala, Note, Making the Jump
from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1631, 1661 n.167 (2009).
58 See Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 835, 837
(noting that genetic testing can serve a number of purposes, including optimizing drug therapy,
diagnostic testing, and predictive testing).
59 SACGHS REPORT, supra note 11, at 11, 50, 51–52 (stating that “gene-by-gene testing” is
more costly than multiplex genetic testing).
60 DON ROSE, MICROARRAY BIOCHIP TECHNOLOGY 19 (Mark Schena ed., 2000).
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (providing that U.S. patent law prohibits one from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the patented invention except by lawful authorization by the
patent holder).
62 How Many Genes Are in the Human Genome?, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFORMATION,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/index.shtml (last modified
July 23, 2013) (reporting that the sequencing of the human chromosomes is “essentially
‘finished’ ”).
63 See Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310
SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005) (finding that 20% of the genes identified in the human genome are
claimed in patents); Stefan Lovgren, One-Fifth of Human Genes Have Been Patented, Study Reveals,
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of gene patent owners present substantial barriers to further development of
the microarray-based testing, especially when the patent owners refuse to
license their inventions to others. Myriad Genetics Incorporated, the defendant
in the Myriad Genetics case, is one of such patent owners. Therefore, the case’s
determination of the patent-eligibility of DNA presents far-reaching
implications.
C. THE CONTEXT OF THE MYRIAD GENETICS CASE

Myriad Genetics Inc. owned the patents for BRCA1 and BRCA2, the two
gene sequences that indicate one’s predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer.64
“Before Myriad’s discovery of the . . . genes, scientists knew that heredity played
a role in establishing a woman’s risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer,
but they did not know which genes were associated with those cancers.”65
Unlike most gene patents owners who are willing to license their patents to
diagnostic laboratories,66 Myriad chose to fully exercise its legal rights by
excluding others from using BRCA1 and BRCA2 in diagnostic tests.67 Myriad
marketed multiple diagnostic tests,68 one of which is a comprehensive test that
provides the full sequence of both BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and costs
$2,400.69 When Myriad began to offer gene diagnostic tests, other laboratories
were performing BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostic sequencing. Upon realizing
this, Myriad sent cease and desist letters, but specified that the notification did
not apply to research testing for non-commercial research programs.70
Association for Molecular Pathology, along with other medical organizations,
researchers, genetic counselors, and patients, sued Myriad in 2010, alleging that
Myriad’s patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2 were invalid.71

NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2005), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/
10/1013_051013_gene_patent.html (reporting that 4,000 genes have been claimed in U.S.
patents).
64 Olga Bogard, Comment, Patenting the Human Body: The Constitutionality of Gene Patents and
Suggested Remedies for Reform, 63 SMU L. REV. 1319, 1327 (2010).
65 Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2122.
66 See Bogard, supra note 64, at 1326.
67 Id. at 1327.
68 See E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12
GENETICS IN MED. S39, S41 (2010).
69 Id.
70 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,
187 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
71 See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
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The publicity surrounding the Myriad Genetics case fueled a public debate,
primarily because the issue at question was framed as a social dilemma.72 Major
news agencies covered the case, the majority of which (77.6%) portrayed
Myriad’s patents in a negative light.73 Some news sources, for example,
characterized Myriad as owning a patent on a piece of the human body.74 Two
publications from the ACLU titled Tell Congress: My Genes Aren’t For Sale and
Liberate the Breast Cancer Genes focused instead on patients’ inability to receive
second opinions or access to the genetic test, as well as the misinformation in
the progress.75
Additionally relevant to understanding the context of the Myriad Genetics case
is the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), signed on
September 16, 2011 by President Barack Obama.76 Section 27 specifies that
“the Director [of the USPTO] shall conduct a study on effective ways to
provide independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where gene
patents and exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist.”77
Notably, the study calls for “research into second opinions on diagnostic tests
and nothing more.”78 Compared to the extensive patent reform, this statement
is “extremely narrow.”79 Prompted by the public controversy and AIA’s
suggestion for some restrictions on gene patents, the Supreme Court took up
the hotly debated question of patent eligibility of genes in 2013.80
D. THE MYRIAD GENETICS CASE AND ITS IMPACTS

To understand the impacts of Myriad, it is helpful to know the case’s
procedural history. The Southern District of New York court held that neither
isolated genes nor synthetic genes (cDNA) were patent eligible subject matter
under § 101. In comparing the isolated DNA and cDNA to the claimed
72 See Timothy Caulfield et al., Myriad and the Mass Media: The Covering of a Gene Patent Controversy,
9 GENETICS IN MED. 850, 852–53 (2007).
73 Id. (“The majority of articles (77.6%) had a negative overall tenor . . . .”).
74 Id.
75 See Sandra Fulton, Tell Congress: My Genes Aren’t for Sale, AM. CIVIL LIB. UNION (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech-womens-rights/tell-congress-my-genes-arent-sale/; Joe
Engardio, Liberate the Breast Cancer Genes, AM. CIVIL LIB. UNION (May 13, 2009), http://www.aclu.
org/2009/05/13/liberate-the-breast-cancer-genes/.
76 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 27(a), 125 Stat. 283, 338 (2001).
77 Id.
78 Johanna Jacob, Should Our Genes Be Part of the Patent Bargain? Maximizing Access to Medical
Diagnostic Advances While Ensuring Research Remains Profitable, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH L.J. 403, 434 (2012).
79 Id.
80 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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discovery in Funk Brothers and distinguishing from the bacteria in Chakrabarty,
the court reasoned that neither were “markedly different” from native DNA,
and thus were ineligible products of nature.81
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that both
isolated DNA and cDNA were patentable subject matter,82 but each Judge
wrote separately, disputing over “whether the act of isolating DNA . . . is an
inventive act that entitles the individual who first isolates it to a patent.”83
Judge Lourie opined that Myriad’s patent claims covered, “molecules that are
markedly different—have a distinctive chemical identity and nature—from
molecules that exist in nature” and are drawn to patent eligible subject matter.84
Judge Lourie further stated that since cDNA did not exist in nature it was also
patent-eligible. Judge Moore, concurring in part, disagreed that the different
chemical structure rendered the isolated DNA sufficiently different from the
native DNA to transform otherwise patent ineligible subject matter to patent
eligible subject matter.85 Nonetheless, the long held tradition supporting the
patent-eligibility of isolated DNA led Judge Moore to decide that isolated DNA
was patent eligible.86 On the other hand, Judge Bryson dissented in part,
believing that isolated DNA should not be patent-eligible, because the discovery
of the sequence is “an unprotectable fact,” and it would “likely . . . have
substantial adverse effects on research and treatment in this important field.”87
Eventually, arguments reached the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs, along
with most researchers in the biology field, argued that including isolated DNA
within the scope of patentable subject matter would block public access to
important genes and prevent the development of medical testing.88 The
defendants, however, focused on their extensive efforts to uncover these genes
and the lower courts’ previous opinions holding that isolated DNA was
patentable subject matter.89 The Supreme Court held that “a naturally occurring
DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it
81 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,
228–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
82 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming in part and reversing in part on remand in light of Mayo).
83 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114.
84 653 F.3d 1329, 1351.
85 Id. at 1364–65.
86 Id. at 1367.
87 Id. at 1373–74.
88 See Mary Mitchell & Dana A Remus, Commentary, Interstitial Exclusivities After Association for
Molecular Pathology, 109 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/asse
ts/fi/109/mitchellremus.pdf.
89 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1333.
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has been isolated,” but that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally
occurring.90 Although products of nature are a judicial exception to patenteligible subject matter, the Court noted that “too broad an interpretation of this
exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.”91 Thus, “patent protection
strikes a delicate balance between creating incentives that lead to creation,
invention, and discovery” and “impeding the flow of information that might
permit, indeed spur, invention.”92 Essentially, the Court characterized Myriad’s
contribution as uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes, but noted that “Myriad did not create anything qualifying as
a new composition of matter.”93 “[E]xtensive effort alone,” the Court declared,
“is insufficient to satisfy the demands of § 101.”94
Overall the biotechnology field welcomed the Court’s holding.95 For
example, some scholars concerned with the danger of anticommons applauded
the result because they argue that gene patents lessen access to the knowledge
about gene sequences, which are basic components for diagnostic testing and
genetic drug development.96 The tragedy of the anticommons forms when
“multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and
no one has an effective privileged use.”97 Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg first argued that exclusive rights of private parties protected by
patents “may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the

Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111.
Id. at 2116 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293).
92 Id.
93 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
94 Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2118.
95 Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for
Affirmance at 2-4, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711 (arguing that DNA and human genes
are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the patents should be declared unenforceable,
because public health necessitates their invalidation); Brief for the S. Baptist Convention as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance at 2, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No.
2010-1406), 2011 WL 585712 (arguing that gene sequence patents are unpatentable subject matter
and are harmful to individuals no matter what their religious beliefs); Brief of Amici Curiae E.
Richard Gold et al. in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 26, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL
5558511 (arguing that the genetic sequence contained in DNA should be considered information
and should therefore be excluded as unpatentable abstract subject matter unless the claim has a
specific function).
96 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anitcommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
97 Id.
90
91
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course of research and product development.”98 Patents on basic building
blocks such as DNA on which further development of gene testing relies
increases these costs due to administrative red tape, deadlines, and researches’
unfamiliarity with patent licensing practices.99 In the anticommons, holdout
situations where researchers have to negotiate licenses independently with
multiple patentee contribute to these high transaction costs.100 The Court’s
holding that DNA is not patent-eligible, hence, alleviates these costs and instead
encourages genetic testing.
The Court’s holding also attracted criticism.101 Some commentators argued
that even if genes should not be patentable, § 101 is the incorrect vehicle to
invalidate gene patents; rather, the Court should use the nonobviousness
requirement (§ 103).102 Section 103 requires a comparison between prior art
and the subject matter to be patented, asking whether the latter would have
been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention.103 The court will inquire whether the inventor’s work resulted in the
creation of something new and whether the result is a fairly significant
improvement from prior arts.104 “[T]o allow otherwise would not only add
nothing to the sum of human knowledge,” but “would in fact injure the public
by removing existing knowledge from public use.”105 The Supreme Court in
KSR stated that whenever “there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions . . . [that] lead[ ] to the anticipated success,” the invention is viewed as
“obvious to try” and is not patentable.106 Since the process used by Myriad to

Id.
Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 675 (2004).
100 Id.
101 Brief of Amici Curiae Rosetta Genomics, Ltd. et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellants,
Supporting Reversal at 14-28, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853324 (arguing that isolated DNA is
patentable subject matter, and patents promote innovation).
102 Linda J. Demaine & Arron Xaxier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 408 (2002) (“[A]
molecular biologist uses a well-known method of creating a cDNA replica of the gene, which
contains only the expressed portions of the sequence (i.e., the exons).”); Amy Nelson, Obviousness
or Inventive Steps as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28
(2004) (“[I]t is well-known to prepare cDNA libraries from human organs and to randomly
isolate and sequence DNAs transform.”).
103 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
104 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
105 Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 931 (2011) (quoting
Bonita Boats v. Thunder Craft Boards, 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)).
106 KRS Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 421.
98
99
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isolate DNA was obvious and routine, the result is not patentable under § 103,
according to these scholars.
Another major critique argues that excluding isolated DNA from patentable
subject matter would defeat the purpose of patent law and disincentivize
innovation.107 Without patent rights, private entities will stop investing capital
and decrease efforts to uncover these important genes.108 In the same line of
argument, some commentators cite the impacts of the Bayh-Dole Act to prove
that patent protection is the primary driving force for private investments.109
The Act followed a situation where most of the funding for biotechnology was
from the government.110 Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the
biotechnology section operated under a commons model, with the federal
government funding “upstream” research that “encouraged broad
dissemination of results in the public domain.”111 The Act allowed the
universities or entities that generated these results to patent them.112 These
commentators argue that the passage of the Act has had “a tremendous effect
on the appropriation of technology.”113 For example, biotechnology patent
applications “increased by more than 300 percent in the first five years after the
enactment of the [Act,] as compared with the five years prior to the passage of
the Act.”114 Private funds currently account for 71% of all research and
development funding in the United States.115 Myriad’s holding, scholars argue,
will significantly reduce this number.116 Faced with conflicting arguments,
scholars have started to search for solutions.

107 Brief of Amici Curiae Rosetta Genomics, Ltd. et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellants,
Supporting Reversal, supra note 101, at 8–9.
108 Id.
109 Michael S. Mireles, An Estimation of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the
Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovations, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 155–56 (2004).
110 Id.
111 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 698.
112 Id.
113 See Mireles, supra note 109, at 155–56.
114 Id. at 160–61.
115 See generally Nat’l Sci. Bd., Science and Engineering Indicators 2008: Chapter 4. Research and
Development: National Trends and International Linkages, NSF.GOV (Jan. 2008), http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/seind08/c4/c4h.htm.
116 Brief of Amici Curiae Rosetta Genomics, Ltd. et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellants,
Supporting Reversal, supra note 101.
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E. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Scholars have recommended several solutions to the likely reduction of
private funding for genetic testing following Myriad Genetics’ holding.117 Most
scholars argue that the Court should allow patents for isolated DNA, but
should also try to minimize the negative effects of patent rights. Ideas for
minimizing the negative effects have included creating a patent pool,118
clearinghouses that provide a two-sided platform for licensees and patent
owners,119 compulsory licensing schemes,120 and patent donations, where
patentees are encouraged to donate their patents to the public.121 Each of these
approaches support the patent eligibility of genes and the resulting exclusive
rights of patentees, while attempting to mitigate the impacts of monopolistic
patent rights. This Note next discusses each of these ideas in more detail.
The idea of patent pool originated to meet the needs of a user of multiple
patents.122 Patents of certain technical fields are pooled together and receive
royalties from the bundle of patents. When companies pool patents together,
the user can license multiple patents from the pool rather than being limited to
asking for a single license from each owner.123 This approach was once
successful in facilitating complex licensing schemes, but has been criticized as
anticompetitive because users rarely look outside the pool for relevant
technologies, thus discriminating against non-members.124
Clearinghouse systems, originating from the banking industry, have been
suggested as a solution to the problem with patent pools.125 Such systems,
provide a two-sided platform between patentees and licensees to maximize their
own profits.126 The system has many promising characteristics similar to a
patent pool, such as dividing royalties between the members within

117 The following is a brief survey of the proposed solutions. For a comparison between them
and the solution that this Note proposes see infra Part V.
118 See generally Courtney C. Scala, Note, Making the Jump from Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent
Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1631 (2009).
119 See generally Kourtney Baltzer, A Clearinghouse: The Solution to Clearing up Confusion in Gene Patent
Licensing, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 519 (2011).
120 Miri Yoon, Gene Patenting Debate: The Meaning of Myriad, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
953, 970 (2010).
121 Kyle Wamstad, Priority Review Vouchers — A Piece of the Incentive Puzzle, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 126,
139 (2009).
122 See Scala, supra note 118, at 1631.
123 Id. at 1646–47.
124 Id. at 1653.
125 See Baltzer, supra note 119, at 531.
126 See id.
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clearinghouses, and an internal committee to facilitate licensing deals.127
Although it may cure the problem of a monopolic patent pool, it is still based
on exclusive rights.128
Another potential solution is compulsory licensing, where patent holders
license their technologies according to statutory requirements.129 This approach
weakens patent rights and, as one scholar argues, fails to adequately reward
inventors for their labor. In all, some scholars argue this approach challenges
the rationale for granting patents in the first place.130
Patent donation, another alternative, relies on the patent owners’ good will
to donate his or her patents to the public domain.131 The patent owners would
benefit from a good reputation and other brand-building advantages by
donating.132 Similarly, a voucher system gives a patent owner who donates his
or her patents into the public domain a priority voucher—entitling him or her a
speedy proceeding for other, future patents.133 Both patent donations and the
voucher systems rely on the patent owners’ charitable intent, thus introducing a
great amount of uncertainty as to what type of knowledge will enter the public
domain.
Another solution, suggested by an academic scholar, expands the
gatekeeping role of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). He urges
Congress to authorize the FDA to approve an entity’s products and services
related to a gene if the entity was the first discoverer of the gene, and to reject
other entities’ products and services related to the same gene.134 This approach,
he argues, eliminates the costly patent prosecution process for newly discovered
gene sequences. However, an entity must notify the FDA when it discovers a
gene. Since non-profit research is not subject to the FDA’s approval, the
approach clears barriers for pure medical testing related to the particular gene
segment. This solution, however, creates waste, particularly in two scenarios.
First, a gene sequence has to be discovered again for non-commercialized
purposes, even though an entity has already discovered it. Second, a discoverer
of a gene sequence cannot profit from the discovery if he does not provide
Id. at 537.
Id. at 521.
129 See Wamstad, supra note 121, at 134.
130 See id. at 131.
131 Johanna Jacob, Comment, Should Our Genes Be Part of the Patent Bargain?: Maximizing Access to
Medical Diagnostic Advances While Ensuring Research Remains Profitable, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 403, 440 (2012).
132 Id.
133 See Wamstad, supra note 121, at 141–42.
134 Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic
Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1449–50 (2013).
127
128

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/9

16

Shi: Finders Keepers, or Finders Weepers? A Proposed Answer to a Quest

2014]

FINDERS KEEPERS, OR FINDERS WEEPERS?

263

products or services related to the gene sequencing. Whether the upfront cost
saved by eliminating the necessity of patent prosecution will override waste
created in these two scenarios will ultimately depend on the commercial value
of a gene sequence, among other factors.
III. ANALYSIS
Patent law strives to balance the competing concerns of public access to
new inventions and incentivizing patent owners to invent. Myriad Genetics’
holding, although partially justifiable for attempting to promote and innovation
and the dissemination of technologies, fails to maintain incentives to attract
sufficient investments in future genetic research. This Note proposes a
registration-reward system to reinstate the balance. Part III begins by analyzing
the limitation of Myriad Genetics’ holding. Next, it interprets Congress’s intent
demonstrated by the passage of the AIA to act upon the guidance provided by
the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics. Finally, Part III urges Congress to
empower a newly created USPTO Board to adopt a registration-reward system,
comparing the proposed system with other alternative solutions, and explaining
why any potential concerns with system will be overridden by its benefits.
A. THE COURT’S RULING IN MYRIAD GENETICS IS PARTIALLY JUSTIFIED, BUT
FAILS TO INCENTIVIZE FUTURE GENETIC RESEARCH

The Court’s holding in Myriad Genetics that genes are not patentable subject
matter is justified in that it better serves the goals of patent law than allowing
genes to be patented. The goal of the patent system is to promote innovation,
production, and dissemination of technologies.135 Gene patents impede
innovation more than they promote it because early development of genetic
technology depends on the wide availability of information encoded in these
important genes. Unlike other already developed fields, genetic testing is at its
beginning stage of cumulating genetic information encoded in DNA.136 Patents
for isolated DNA would greatly increase downstream transaction costs by
monopolizing the basic information encoded in the genes which could be used
by many entities to develop gene testing methods, genetic drugs, and medical
devices.137

135 Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON.
PERSP. 131, 136 (2002).
136 See SACGHS REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
137 See Lee, supra note 99, at 675.
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The Court, moreover, has a justifiable reason to set a high threshold of
patentability in Myriad Genetics because patents shield patentees from
competition for twenty years.138
For a fast-advancing field such as
biotechnology, this head start in many cases gives a patentee a right to
monopolize a specific area for more than twenty years to come. Therefore, the
stricter requirement for eligibility in Myriad Genetics balances the competing
goals of patent law by promoting the dissemination of new knowledge and
technology.
Furthermore, the Court’s categorical ruling in Myriad Genetics is justified
because newly discovered gene sequences would likely also not pass the
nonobviousness test under § 103.139 The Myriad Genetics Court’s ruling suggests
that the routine use of the isolation process, regardless of its complexity, it not
an inventive act sufficient to meet the requirement of nonobviousness. While
Myriad argued that they invested extensive capital and efforts in discovering
BRCA1 and BRCA2,140 a routine use of a process to generate a material of
known characteristics that is obvious to one with “ordinary skill in the art” will
not meet the requirements of § 103.141
Although the Court rightly held isolated DNA patent ineligible due to these
justifications, the Court should have likewise held cDNA ineligible because the
process of creating cDNA is also well-known and routine “to a person having
ordinary skill in the art.”142 It is true that, unlike isolated DNA, which shares
similar gene sequences with native DNA, cDNA’s sequences of nucleotides are
different. One major difference is that cDNA only contains coding regions
(exons).143 Since any given gene consists of over 90% of non-coding regions,
the chemical structure of cDNA differs dramatically from that of native DNA.
Nevertheless, measuring against the standard from KSR, cDNA would have
difficulty meeting § 103’s requirement of nonobviousness. A person with
ordinary skill in gene sequencing who knows the process of creating a cDNA
based on its matching DNA will be capable of using the same process to make
cDNA to BRCA1 and BRCA2.144 Therefore, despite other valid justifications,

35 U.S.C. § 154.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
140 See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 535–37.
141 35 U.S.C. § 103.
142 Id.; see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 535–37.
143 ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 36, at 537.
144 Some lower courts refuse to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling on cDNA. See Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., No. C 11-06391 SI, 2013 WL 5863022, V11 n.8 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 2013).
138
139
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the holding in Myriad Genetics failed to include cDNA within the scope of
ineligible subject matter.
Most importantly, Myriad Genetics’ holding will drive away private
investments in the discovery of gene sequences, and thus shrink the pool of
available gene sequences to use for further research and the development of
new technology. Discovering a particular gene is a time-consuming and
expensive, albeit conventional, process.145 Moreover, it is uncertain whether the
process will successfully find a particular gene. The strong, exclusive rights
afforded by patents used to be sufficient to incentivize private entities to invest
in the searching processes. The high threshold for patent eligibility set by Myriad
Genetics’ holding, however, will undoubtedly increase the risk for private entities
in the genetic research field and potentially even remove their incentives to
continue their efforts. Some scholars argue that the negative impact of Myriad
Genetics’ holding is inevitable, but patent rights are not and should not be the
only incentive sufficient to attract private investments. An alternative type of
protection for isolated gene sequences to attract private investments in future
genetic research can work.
Contrary to what was argued by some scholars,146 the effects of the BayhDole Act do not prove that patent rights for newly discovered genes are
necessary to maintain innovation in genetic research. It is true that after the
passage of the Act, private funding increased greatly, as did patent applications;
but, those patents were based on the successful results from the basic research
supported by the government.147 This government-funded research
accumulated a rich knowledge base in the public domain that fueled the later
development and patent applications after the passage of the Act.148 Therefore,
the increase in the number of patents after the passage of the Act is insufficient
evidence to support the argument that patent protection caused the rapid
development of biological research. Private funding is beneficial for biological
research because it attracts talent and enables the researchers to procure better
equipment, but patent rights are not necessarily the only way to attract private
funds. There may be alternative ways outside the patent system to incentivize
private players while facilitating the goal of patent law. This Note proposes an
alternative type of protection for gene sequences that equally attracts private
investment.

145
146
147
148

Id. at *1.
See generally Mireles, supra note 109.
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 698.
Id.
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B. CONGRESS SHOULD TAKE LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Since Congress did not pass any provision in the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA) to clarify the patent eligibility of DNA, it likely intended to
defer to the judicial expertise on this hotly debated issue. However, as
evidenced by the impact of Myriad Genetics’ holding, the patent-eligibility of
DNA is a policy question that is better left to the legislature. Thus, Congress
should act upon the Court’s guidance and resolve remaining issues left by the
Court’s ruling in Myriad Genetics. The divide between both scientific and legal
minds in separately written judicial opinions by the Federal Circuit judges,
amicus briefs, and disagreements within the branches of government
demonstrate how “reasonable people differ on how science and patent law
should align”149 on the patent eligibility of genes. Legal analysis and strong
emotions are in play behind the issue. For example, Federal Circuit Judge
Lourie’s opinion in Myriad “fell on the side of deference to long-held property
rights,” while Judge Bryson’s dissenting opinion emphasized that “public policy
outweighed that deference.”150 In all, the patent-eligibility of DNA is
“inextricably intertwined with policy.”151
149 Compare, e.g., Brief for AARP as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Arguing for Affirmance at 2-4, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2011 WL 585711 (arguing that DNA and human
genes are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the patents should be declared unenforceable
because public health necessitates their invalidation); Brief for the S. Baptist Convention as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Arguing for Affirmance at 2, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No.
2010-1406), 2011 WL 585712 (arguing that gene sequence patents are unpatentable subject matter
and are harmful to individuals no matter their religious beliefs); Brief of Amici Curiae E. Richard
Gold et al. in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 26, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 5558511
(arguing that the genetic sequence contained in DNA should be considered information and
should therefore be excluded as unpatentable abstract subject matter unless the claim has a
specific function), with, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 9-11, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320; Brief of Amici Curiae Rosetta Genomics,
Ltd. et al. in Support of Defendants-Appellants, Supporting Reversal at 14-28, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No.
2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853324 (arguing that isolated DNA is patentable subject matter, and that
patents stimulate innovation). See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Has the US Government Abandoned Gene
Patents?, NATURE.COM NEWSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2010), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2010/11/will_
the_us_government_abandon.html (“No lawyers from the patent office are listed on the brief —
a possible sign that the position has few fans at the USPTO, which has granted thousands of gene
patents over the years.”).
150 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1373 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“In my view, those claims are not directed to patentable subject matter, and if sustained the
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Seemingly, the lack of action from Congress indicates its acquiescence to
granting patents to isolated DNA. In support of the contention that gene
patents “cause more harm than good to society and technological
development”152 are concerns including the “preemption of future research;
quality of care and patient access; and an unearned extended patent
monopoly.”153 However, Congress, faced with the above concerns, took a very
narrow approach in the passage of AIA. As mentioned, the language in section
27 states that the “Director [of the USPTO] shall conduct a study on effective
ways to provide independent, confirming genetic diagnostic test activity where
gene patents and exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic tests
exist.”154 It continues, “Notably, the study calls for research into second
opinions on diagnostic tests and nothing more.”155 Compared to the rest of the
extensive patent reform brought by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, this
statement is “extremely narrow,”156 despite awareness in Congress of the issue
involved in the Myriad case.157
But, Congress’s acquiescence to granting patents for isolated DNA may
suggest that it intended to receive guidance from the Court on the doctrine of
patent-eligible subject matter. Its statement, although narrow, fully expressed
its concern about the harmful consequences of granting gene patents. Since the
Court began to define the subject matter doctrine in Funk Brothers, it has refined
its interpretation of § 101 numerous times in recent years.158 The Court,
therefore, arguably has valuable experience in judging the patent eligibility of
DNA, and can provide much-needed guidance to the Congress.
Upon receiving the guidance from the Court in Myriad Genetics that gene
sequences are not patent-eligible, Congress should now craft a legislative
court’s decision will likely have broad consequences, such as preempting methods for wholegenome sequencing, even though Myriad’s contribution to the field is not remotely consonant
with such effects.”).
151 Jacob, supra note 131, at 426.
152 Mitchell & Remus, supra note 88, at 35.
153 Jacob, supra note 131, at 434.
154 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 27(a).
155 Jacob, supra note 131, at 434.
156 Id.
157 See bills submitted by both parties pertaining to the issue, e.g., Genomic Research and
Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007) (sponsored by one Republican and five
Democratic Representatives) and Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002,
H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002) (sponsored by one Republican and two Democratic
Representatives).
158 See Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 127; Benson, 409 U.S. at 63; Flook, 437 U.S. at 584;
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218; Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1289; Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107.
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solution to address the reduced incentives to invest in the discovery of new
gene sequences caused by Myriad Genetics’ holding. This Note proposes a
reward system whereby a Board within the USPTO would provide royalties to
discoverers of new genes in order to attract an equivalent scale of efforts and
investment to that under the current patent system.
C. SOLUTION: THE REGISTRATION-REWARD SYSTEM

1. The Framework of the Registration-Reward System. Congress should authorize
the USPTO to form a Board consisting of economists, patent attorneys, and
technical experts to administer a registration and reward system (“the reward
system”). Under the reward system the Board would determine the economic
value of a discovery of a gene sequence and designate a royalty i.e., a small
percentage of profit that is to be paid to the Board by anyone using a discovery
that is registered with the Board, taking into account the efforts necessary to
make the discovery and the existing and potential markets for the particular
discovery.
The licensing division of the U.S. Copyright Office, which administers the
compulsory and statutory licenses in the Copyright Act, can serve as a model
for the newly created USPTO Board. However, it should also differ in several
aspects. First, the Board should be set up within the USPTO because the
patent office is in the best position to recruit patent attorneys and technical
experts to answer questions about any particular genes. The USPTO has years
of experience of reviewing biological inventions, so a decision made on the
economic value of a gene sequence by the Board will have credibility from the
get-go.
Second, the registrant will receive entitlement to a royalty from the Board,
unlike a registrant with the Copyright Office who gains stronger legal recourse
against potential infringers.159 The Board should build an economic model to
quantitatively value a newly discovered and registered gene sequence, taking
into account several primary factors: the amount of reasonably necessary efforts
needed to locate the gene, the types of application for which the gene can be
used, and the level of creativity involved in the discovery. Additional factors
include the current price of diagnostic testing, the number of competitors
working on the same sequence, possible advancements in diagnostic testing,
derivatives markets, the extent of the disclosure, and the likelihood of

159 In compulsory licensing situations, the registrant will also be entitled to a royalty, but
compulsory license differs from the Registration-Reward system. See supra Part II.
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commercialization. The requirements for patentability160 are useful to
determine the amount of reward, but failure to meet any of them will not
prevent registration. Unlike the patent system, where an inventor either
receives protection for twenty years or nothing, the flexible registration-reward
system will adjust the amount of royalty according to the extent to which the
requirements of patentability are satisfied. The Board could enlist help from
economists, or fund research to develop the economic model. Such a model
would be constantly updated by data related to each registered gene sequence.
Over time, the model could become fairly robust. The Board, owning this
model, will then be the true experts in valuation of new gene sequences. This
Note will next discuss some of the factors in the economic model, the
registration process, and the accessibility of registered gene sequences.
The Board should hire outside experts to determine necessary efforts
reasonably required by a person with an ordinary skill of art to uncover a gene
sequence. Technical experts on a particular gene sequence may be competitors
of the registrant. Since the methods of marking genetic sequences are wellknown and repetitive, the likelihood that several competitors search for one
particular gene is high, as witnessed in Myriad Genetics.161 The Board should
therefore have little difficulty in hiring one of the competitors to give an expert
opinion, which the Board will use to negotiate a fair royalty with a registrant.
The major concern is that biotechnology develops so rapidly that any attempt
to estimate the reasonable efforts required to locate a gene sequence may
produce inaccurate results; but using experts who are familiar with the latest
developments in genetic research will likely mitigate this concern. The greater
the necessary efforts required in locating a gene, the higher the royalty the
discoverer is entitled to. A market analysis is then needed to nail down the
amount of royalty that will be granted.
Two important factors in estimating the value of a discovery of a particular
gene are the current and future market demand. The board would hire
disinterested firms to perform this market analysis. These firms often perform
similar analysis of newly invented technologies for investment firms and
corporations, so this type of analysis will be familiar to them. To ensure
accuracy, multiple testimonies are necessary. If multiple inputs vary drastically,
the Board has the option to take the average. Not surprisingly, costs may be an
issue because the services of these firms are not cheap, but there are two ways
in which they can be paid. First, firms can either receive direct payment, just as
See supra Part II.
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,
187 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
160
161
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they would for providing services to any other clients. Alternatively, the Board
can agree to share part of the royalty that they will collect from the users of a
registered gene sequence. Either way, the reward system will require an initial
round of funding to start, which Congress will have to initiate and provide.
The accuracy of market analysis is inevitably limited. Market analysis for
genes that have known applications or possible applications will be more
accurate than that for genes with no immediately identifiable utilities. Even a
gene sequence with known applications can quickly be replaced with a laterdiscovered gene because of the rapid advancement in the biotechnology field.
The discoverer of a new gene sequence bears the burden of the inaccuracy of
the valuation by the Board. This should incentivize entities to thoroughly
analyze risks before their investment.
The Board will then offer the determined amount of royalty to the
discoverer of a new gene sequence. The discoverer can reject the offer and
keep its discovery as a trade secret, or the discoverer can alternatively negotiate
with the Board. In order to prevent negotiation gridlocks, the Board will allow
an entity that discovered the same or substantially similar gene sequence later
than the original discoverer to register preliminarily while a negotiation between
the Board and the original discoverer takes place. If the original discoverer
cannot reach an agreement with the Board one year after the entity’s
preliminary registration, the preliminary registration will automatically be
converted to an official registration, and the original discoverer loses the right
to register. The Board can refer to precedents in patent infringement case law
to determine whether two discoveries are substantially similar. This rule would
prevent any intentional delay by a discoverer in reaching an agreement with the
Board.
Third, the registration process with the Board should be as straightforward
as the process with the Copyright Office. Any discovery of a gene sequence
could be registered. Registration requires disclosing the discovery, paying a
registration fee, and negotiating a royalty with the Board. A registered gene
sequence will fall into the public domain after 150 years from the date of the
registration, which is similar to the life of a copyrighted work.162
Fourth, like the works registered with the Copyright office, all gene
sequences that are filed with the Board should be indexed in multiple ways and
searchable by the public. The gene search system can be indexed by the genetic
code, i.e., the long sequence of various combinations of A, G, T, and C, or they
can be indexed according to their chemical groups and domain names. For
162 17 U.S.C. § 302 (copyright in a work “endures for a term consisting of the life of the author
and 70 years after the author’s death”).
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example, the BRCA1 gene will be indexed as C3H4 (Zinc finger) and BRCT
(BRCA1 C Terminus). Thus anyone who is interested in discovering a
sequence containing this domain can search to see whether it has already been
discovered. The same gene sequence will be assigned a number that will appear
consistently regardless of how one searched for it. Each registration will
contain standard categories of information, including the royalty to the board
(in percentage format), how it was discovered, potential applications
recommended by the Board, the predicted market, the nonobviousness and
novelty of the sequence, and anything important to promote the understanding
of the searcher about the gene sequence. The standardized information will
make registered gene sequence easier to understand for searchers, thus
improving the efficiency of the system. It also provides searchers notice about
the discovery of a particular gene sequence and prevents efforts to reinvent the
wheel.
Fifth, unlike the copyright registration system, the reward system imposes an
obligation on a searcher to pay royalties if he or she uses a registered gene
sequence and profits from that usage. A searcher must subscribe to the system
in order to search for any relevant gene sequences. When he or she signs up for
the system, a small subscription fee will be required to authenticate a
subscription agreement that states that he or she agrees to pay according to the
royalty assigned to each registered discovery if he or she generates any profits.
Any subscriber to the gene search system prima facie used all discoveries in the
system. Therefore, the reward system is quasi-open to the public.
Non-subscribing entities that use any registered discovery to generate profits
must also pay the royalty, or will be subjected to a fine. The reward system will
also reward any whistleblower for reporting undisclosed usage.
The
whistleblower must file a complaint grounded on concrete facts and will only be
rewarded if the complaint turns out to be true, risking a penalty if it does not.
An alternative approach could be to collect a percentage of profits only from
subscribers. The latter is a bright-line rule and easier to work with, but may
discourage subscription.
Sixth, just as the licensing division of the U.S. Copyright Office is authorized
to collect royalties for compulsory licenses, the Board should be empowered by
the legislature to collect a royalty from anyone who uses any registered
discovery. Any use will be subject to collection. “Use” should be defined as
direct incorporation of any registered sequence to a product or a service,
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including diagnostic tests for a trade purpose.163 The Board will collect royalties
from any patents that incorporate any registered sequence. Indirect use of the
gene sequence, such as using the registered gene sequence for finding another
gene sequence, is not “use,” and thus will not subject the indirect user to royalty
payments.
Seventh, each discovery should be assigned a royalty rate at which any user
of this discovery is subject to pay to the Board. Although the royalty may be
small most of the time, the cumulative economic return over 150 years may be
even more than what a patent could obtain through licensing. Thus, this royalty
will provide incentives to private entities to invest efforts and capital to locate
these gene sequences. On the other hand, if the entity using the sequence does
not generate profits, it is not obligated to pay the Board. Therefore, early-stage
companies and research institutions can potentially gain great benefits from
public access to these sequences.
Users of multiple registered sequences will pay an apportioned royalty rather
than the sum of royalties assigned to each registered gene. For example,
consider a product using five registered gene segments with the assigned royalty
of 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.4%, 0.5%, and 0.6%, respectively. The calculation is easy:
each assigned royalty divided by the sum of all assigned royalties constitutes the
apportioned royalty. Thus, the seller of the product in this example must pay
the Board the apportioned royalty of 0.1%, 0.15%, 0.2%, 0.25%, and 0.3% for
the five registered gene sequences. Therefore, users of multiple registered gene
segments need not deplete all of their profits to pay royalties to the Board when
the accumulative royalty is equal to or greater than 100%. Although the royalty
to each registered gene is reduced significantly by apportionment, it is not unfair
because each particular registered gene is only one of many used in the product
Also akin to the licensing division of the Copyright Office, the Board will set
up an account for each registered gene to deposit royalties and periodically
distribute them to registrants. Since the USPTO has no expertise in finance
management, it shall be up to the registrants to choose whether to hire wealth
management experts, or allow the Board to keep the cash in the accounts under
prevailing interest rates and distribute the royalties each year to the registrants,
unless they withdraw all funds from the accounts before the distribution date.
Like the USPTO, the decision by the Board is subject to judicial review.
Private entities should not be deprived of their rights to a jury if they allege they
were forced by the Board to forfeit their rights to a reward or to a higher
163 This definition is narrower than that from the patent law as appeared in 35 U.S.C. § 271
(“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offer to
sell . . . infringes the patent.”).
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reward. The judicial review process will focus on issues such as whether the
agreement between the registrants and the Board was unconscionable, was
made under duress, or was made as the result of mistake. These issues will be
less technical than inquiries for patent prosecution.
The reward system will further the goal of the patent system to promote
innovation in genetic testing. As previously discussed, gene sequences are
critical for downstream scientific users and excluding them from the public only
hurts society as a whole. However, discoverers should not be left emptyhanded, or they will refuse to invest in or disclose their discoveries. The
process of locating a gene on DNA, although routine and well known, is
difficult and time-consuming. Similar to treasure hunting, those with sufficient
resources and the strongest commitment usually succeed. As treasure hunters
are rewarded by their findings, discoverers of new gene sequences should
likewise receive some type of reward. In light of the Court’s ruling that gene
sequences are patent-ineligible subject matter in Myriad Genetics, the legislature
should therefore act to set up the reward system within the USPTO to promote
innovations in genetic research without excluding newly discovered gene
sequences from the public. The reward system will address the remaining
public concern in wake of Myriad Genetics and is the most effective approach,
among multiple proposed solutions, to serve the goal of the patent system.
2. The Advantage of the Registration-Reward System over Alternative Policy Choices.
The reward system is overall the best solution compared to patent pools,
compulsory licensing, patent donation, and other proposed solutions. The
reward system is a better alternative to patent pools because the system is not
anticompetitive. Patent pools discriminate against non-member entities because
licensees will prefer to shop within the patent bundles and negotiate a single
license covering multiple technologies, rather than select individual technologies
outside the pools. The pool is a one-sided platform that aims to maximize the
benefits for the members of the pools.164 By contrast, the reward system is a
two-sided platform. The Board both pays royalties to registrants and ensures
public access to registered gene sequences. The registrants are out of the
picture when potential users shop for their gene sequences of interest. Actual
users must pay the royalty to the Board.
Second, the proposed system offers more advantages than compulsory
licensing. Registrants are not forced to license their discoveries for the public
interest. Although they are encouraged to register, discovers of gene sequences
can choose to keep their discoveries as trade secrets without any legal
obligations. This alternative of trade secret protection may be beneficial if they
164

See Scalia, supra note 118, at 1661 n.167.
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deem that the potential award of registration is not worth the benefits reaped
from keeping their discovery in secret. The owners of these discoveries are
compensated at a rate that they have agreed to prior to their disclosure, and are
less coerced than if they had to accept an imposed licensing fee. Due to its
contractual, non-coercive nature,165 the reward system will attract many gene
sequences into its pool. Most importantly, this reward system is a more direct
and cheaper approach than compulsory licensing. Registration with the Board
does not involve expensive patent prosecution. As a result, the users of the
registration-reward system will likely be subject to lower royalty than licensees
of compulsory licenses. In addition, this system will avoid massive patent
litigation costs because the registrants with the reward system have agreed to a
designated royalty prior to the public disclosure of their discoveries. Overall,
the reward system will be much more affordable than compulsory licensing.
Third, the reward system is also better than the alternatives of a patent
donation or voucher system. Unlike a patent donation or voucher system, the
reward system does not rely on the registers’ charitable efforts, which contain
too much uncertainty and will fail to attract a great number of newly discovered
gene sequences.166 The reward system even has the potential to include all
newly discovered gene sequences over time because the cumulative royalty
payment for a registered gene sequence over 150 years can be high.
Finally, the closest approach to the reward system is the FDA-exclusive right
system.167 This approach allows the FDA to approve or reject a gene produce
or service based on whether the owner of the product or service is the original
discoverer of the gene. Like the reward system, this approach does not require
discoverers to go through the patent prosecution process to obtain exclusive
rights. It is also similar in the sense that it imposes no burdens on entities that
use the newly discovered gene sequences on not-for-profit research.168
Although this approach seems more convenient because it takes advantage of
many existing functions served by the FDA, its attempt to confine solutions
within the existing system poses new problems.
The first problem is that the FDA-exclusive right system creates waste. This
approach likens monopolic patent rights but lacks the flexible alienation of
patents. Because almost all products and services based on a gene require the
FDA’s approval, this approach essentially blocks anybody from using the gene.
Seemingly, this approach still allows non-profit uses of genes; however, these
See Yoon, supra note 120, at 970.
See Jacob, supra note 131, at 440–41.
167 Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic
Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399 (2013).
168 Id.
165
166
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non-profit users can hardly receive funding for the lack of potential
commerciality of their research. In addition, any discoverer of a gene cannot
assign the gene to others because the FDA will not approve others’ products
based on the gene made by the discoverer. The restricted commercial
exploitation to the original discoverer of a gene will create waste.
Second, the FDA-exclusive right system wrongly empowers the FDA to
approve a product based not on safety but on who is the first to discover a gene
sequence. The FDA has the scientific expertise to determine whether one
product is safe for the market, but providing exclusive rights is essentially a legal
question to which the FDA does not possess the requisite expertise. This
situation would be akin to letting a film rating agency, such as Motion Picture
Association of America, determine an actor’s right of publicity. In all, the FDA
simply lacks the expertise to perform such a role and thus should not be
granted the authority to do so.
Third, the FDA-exclusive right approach tends to discriminate against
individual discoverers by discouraging their applications. Individuals with little
experience in dealing with the FDA may be intimidated by its complex and
complicated approval process. Therefore, these individuals may hesitate to
apply for the approval of any products made out of a newly discovered gene
sequence. The reward system, by contrast, avoids the problems entailed by the
FDA-exclusive right approach. Although it too has some limitations, they are
ultimately overridden by its advantages.
3. The Benefits of the Registration-Reward System Override its Potential Problems.
Some potential concerns with the registration-reword system include the costs
and effectiveness of a new bureaucracy, granting too much power to such a
bureaucracy, and the system’s discrimination against domestic corporations.
First, although some argue that the Board may become an expensive
bureaucracy, the function it serves will greatly outweigh its costs. The
transaction costs it saves will be much more than the expense required to run
the Board. For example, the high costs from infringement litigation over gene
patents will be eliminated. Although the Board may initiate litigation to collect
royalties, the scale and extent of litigation will be greatly reduced in comparison.
Patent litigation cases center around the validity of a patent in question and
whether the alleged infringing product contains every element claimed in a
patent. Collection suits involve the more direct question of whether the wouldbe-defendants incorporated a gene sequence at question into their products.
Faced with the less ambiguous question involved in the collection suits and thus
the higher risk of fines, would-be-defendants likely will choose to pay royalties,
thereby avoiding litigation. The system also saves the expense of securing
licenses from a patentee. Under the reward system, each newly discovered gene
sequence requires only one round of negotiation between the Board and the
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registrant. After that, the gene sequence is open to any users who are willing to
pay designated royalties. Users avoid dealing with the registrant. By contrast,
each potential licensee of a patent must negotiate with the patentee. Thus, each
use will require a separate negotiation and greatly increase transaction costs.
Even for patent pools where one license covers all, each entity needs a separate
blanket license. The reward system avoids this complex blanket license because
the newly discovered gene sequence, once registered, is open to the public.
Therefore, the cost-saving advantage of the reward system will justify its
existence.
Another concern is the effectiveness of such a system. Some argue that the
reward may not be a strong enough incentive for private firms. While this
argument may be true in the short term, the aggregate effect of single digit
profits will be significant over 150 years. For gene-sequences that have no
known practical applications immediately, 150 years should be long enough to
prove their worth. In addition, once the reward system is established, a new
form of property rights will be created. Private entities that prefer a quick
capital return can alienate their rights to royalty from the Board. Therefore, the
reward is at least comparable to returns from gene patents, whether it is
generated in a short or long term, and private firms will have strong enough
incentives to register with the reward system,
Next, another potential concern is that the reward system will risk granting
too much power to the Board. There seems to be an asymmetry of power
between the Board and registrants; however, such risk is mitigated both by
judicial review and by registrants’ ability to either negotiate a royalty acceptable
to them, or to maintain their discoveries as trade secrets. Like the patent
system, the reward system includes judicial review of the reasonability of the
Board’s act and the royalty, which serves as a major check. Moreover, the
registrants in the reward system can decide the extent of their disclosures—
unlike the patent system that requires an applicant to disclose enough
information to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to reproduce the
invention, the reward system has no such requirement. A registrant may choose
to disclose less information in exchange for a smaller royalty. Therefore,
potential asymmetry of power within the reward system is reasonably mitigated
by both judicial review and the ability to decide the amount of disclosure
through the negotiation process.
Another concern is the reward system’s international implications because
the system seems to discriminate against corporations in the United States.
Similar to the patent system which differs by countries, a uniform international
legal system is desired yet nonexistent. No other country has a similar reward
system for gene sequences, so U.S. corporations that use any gene sequences
will be subjected to collection of royalties, but foreign corporations will not.
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Due to the high costs of litigating overseas, the Board may give up chasing
foreign corporation for small royalties. Nevertheless, there is a solution drawn
from other similar situations where U.S. law applies to foreign entities: these
foreign corporations found to have directly used the gene sequences will have a
judgment pending against them in the U.S., and unless they pay royalties owed
to the Board, such judgment will impact their future activities in the U.S.169 This
system, when mature, has the potential to be a model from which other
countries can learn and simulate.
Overall, the Court’s holding in Myriad Genetics is partially justified for
balancing goals of patent law. However, the result fails to maintain adequate
incentives for private investment in genetic research, and wrongly declared
cDNA patent-eligible subject matter. Upon receiving the Court’s guidance,
Congress should now enact the reward system to resolve the lingering concerns.
Though the reward system presents some potential limitations, it is better
overall than alternatives and is needed to encourage future genetic research.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s categorical rejection of naturally occurring DNA as
patent-eligible subject matter in Myriad Genetics clears the roadblocks for further
development of microarray testing for genetic research. However, this result
will discourage private investments in the discovery of genes. Therefore, this
Note proposes that Congress should take legislative action and set up a
registration-reward system within the USPTO.
The registration-reward system will compensate any registrant of a newly
discovered gene at a royalty rate determined by a Board consisting of technical
and legal experts. The Board will consider many factors when determining the
value of the gene discovery, including market demand, efforts required, and the
extent of disclosure by the registrant. The registrant will then come to an
agreement with the Board on a royalty to be collected from potential users of
the gene and the Board will publish the gene in the system available for any
subscriber of the system to search and see.
The registration-reward system is the best solution in light of Myriad Genetics’
holding because it places the knowledge of genetic information into the public
domain, while incentivizing private entities to invest in the discovery of genes,
thereby balancing competing policy concerns. Additionally, it bypasses the
expensive patent prosecution process and avoids massive patent litigation costs.
It is less coercive than compulsory licensing, less anticompetitive than patent
169

28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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pools, more predictable than patent donation, and more economic than the
FDA-exclusive right system. Although running the registration-reward system
will also incur costs, saved transaction costs through eliminating patent
litigation and patent license negotiation will outweigh the operating costs of the
registration-reward system. Moreover, the cumulative royalties for many
products and services over 150 years will be comparable to or higher than the
value of a patent on a gene, and overall enough to attract discoverers of genes
into the registration-reward system.
In conclusion, the system has the potential to help the Court to deal with
the issue of patent eligibility, and can finally and effectively strike “a delicate
balance between creating incentives that lead to creation, invention, and
discovery” and “impeding the flow of information that might permit, indeed
spur, invention.”170

170

Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
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